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Abstract
Real-valued logics underlie an increasing number of neuro-symbolic approaches,
though typically their logical inference capabilities are characterized only qual-
itatively. We provide foundations for establishing the correctness and power of
such systems. For the first time, we give a sound and complete axiomatization
for a broad class containing all the common real-valued logics. This axioma-
tization allows us to derive exactly what information can be inferred about the
combinations of real values of a collection of formulas given information about
the combinations of real values of several other collections of formulas. We then
extend the axiomatization to deal with weighted subformulas. Finally, we give a
decision procedure based on linear programming for deciding, under certain nat-
ural assumptions, whether a set of our sentences logically implies another of our
sentences.
1 Introduction
Motivation. Recent years have seen growing interest in approaches for augmenting the capabili-
ties of learning-based methods with those of reasoning, often broadly referred to as neuro-symbolic
(though they may not be strictly neural). One of the key goals that neuro-symbolic approaches have
at their root is logical inference, or reasoning. However, the representation of classical 0-1 logic
is generally insufficient for this goal, because representing uncertainty is essential to AI. In order
to merge with the ideas of learning, the truth values dealt with must be real-valued (we shall take
these to be real numbers in the interval [0, 1], where intuitively, 0 means “completely false”, and 1
means “completely true”), whether the uncertainty semantics are those of probabilities, subjective
beliefs, neural network activations, or fuzzy set memberships. For this reason, many major ap-
proaches have turned to real-valued logics. Logic tensor networks [12] define a logical language on
real-valued vectors corresponding to groundings of terms computed by a neural network, which can
use any of the common real-valued logics (e.g. Łukasiewicz, product, or Gödel) for its connectives
(e.g. ∧, ∨, ¬, and⇒). Probabilistic soft logics [1] draw a correspondence of their approach based on
Markov random fields (MRFs) with satisfiability of statements in a real-valued logic (Łukasiewicz).
Tensorlog [3], also based on MRFs but implemented in neural network frameworks, draws a corre-
spondence of its approach to the use of connectives in a real-valued logic (product). Logical neural
networks (LNNs) [11] draw a correspondence between activation functions of neural networks and
connectives in real-valued logics. To complete a full correspondence between neural networks and
statements in real-valued logic, LNN defines a class of real-valued logics allowing weighted inputs,
which represent the relative influence of subformulas. While widely regarded as fundamental to the
goal of AI, the reasoning capabilities of the aforementioned systems are typically made qualitatively
versus quantitatively and mathematically. While learning theory (roughly, what it means to perform
learning) is well articulated and, for 0-1 logic, what it means to perform reasoning is well studied,
reasoning is surprisingly not well formalized for real-valued logics. As reasoning becomes an in-
creasing goal of learning-based work, it becomes important to have a solid mathematical footing for
it.
Preprint. Under review.
Formalization of the idea of real-valued logics is old and fundamental, going back to the origins of
formal logic. It is not well known that Boole himself invented a probabilistic logic in the 19th century
[2], where formulas were assigned real values corresponding to probabilities. It was used in AI to
model the semantics of vague concepts for commonsense reasoning by expert systems [13]. Real-
valued logic is used in linguistics to model certain natural language phenomena [9], in hardware
design to deal with multiple stable voltage levels [4], and in databases to deal with queries that are
composed of multiple graded notions, such as the redness of an object, that can range from 0 (“not
at all red”) to 1 (“completely red”) [6]. Despite all this, while definitions of logical correctness and
power (generally, soundness and completeness) are well established and corresponding procedures
for theorem proving having those properties are abundant for classical logics, to our knowledge and
to the knowledge of experts we consulted in the field, the equivalents for real-valued logics (where
the values can take arbitrarily values between 0 and 1) have not been established to date. We show
these basic equivalents for the first time.
This paper. We define a novel class of sentences that capture the interactions between the values
of various components. We then give a sound and complete axiomatization for real-valued logic,
including the use of weights. Usual complete axiomatizations of real-valued logic deal only with
valid formulas, that is, formulas with truth value 1. Thus, they infer only valid real-valued logic
formulas. (See, for example, Hájek’s book [7].) Furthermore, they do not allowweights. By contrast,
our axiomatization deals with formulas with arbitrary values in [0, 1] and allows weights.
An especially useful real-valued logic for logical neural nets is Łukasiewicz logic, for several rea-
sons. First, the ∧, ∨, ¬, and⇒ operators are essentially linear, in that if a1 is the truth value of a
formulaA1, and a2 is the truth value of a formulaA2, then (a)A1∧A2 has valuemax{0, a1+a2−1},
(b) A1 ∨ A2 has value min{1, a1 + a2}, (c) ¬A1 has value 1 − a1, and (d) A1 ⇒ A2 is equivalent
to ¬A1 ∨ A2, and so has value min{1, 1 − a1 + a2}.1 Second, it is easy to incorporate weights,
in a differentiable manner. Thus, if w1 and w2 are nonnegative weights of A1 and A2, respectively,
then we can take the weighted value of A1 ∧ A2 to bemax{0, 1− w1(1− a1)− w2(1 − a2)}, and
similarly for A1 ∨ A2.
Throughout this paper, we take the domain of each function in the real-valued logic to be [0, 1] or
[0, 1]×[0, 1] and the range to be [0, 1]. This is a common assumption for many real-valued logics, but
all of our results go through with obvious modifications if the domains areDk for possibly multiple
choices of arity k and range D, for arbitrary subsets D of the reals. We note that real-valued logic
can be viewed as a special case of multi-valued logic [10], although in multi-valued logic there is
typically a finite set of truth values, not necessarily linearly ordered.
We also provide a decision procedure for deciding, whether a set of our sentences logically implies
another of our sentences, under certain natural assumptions. We implemented the decision algo-
rithm, dubbed SoCRAtic logic (for Sound and Complete Real-valued Axiomatic logic), which we
describe in detail and make available in source code form in the supplementary material.
Our sentences allow arbitrary real-valued logics, as does our sound and complete axiomatization,
but our decision procedure depends heavily on the choice of real-valued logic, and in particular
is tailored towards Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic. This is because a key portion of our decision
procedure is linear programming, and we depend on the essentially linear nature of Łukasiewicz
logic and the ease of dealing with min and max in Gödel logic.
Overview. Until the final section, we do not allow weights. In Section 2, we give our basic notions,
including what a model is and what a sentence is. We show that sentences of the form (σ, θ),
which says that the value of the formula σ is θ, are not sufficiently expressive. We then consider
sentences of the form (σ, S), which says that the value of the formula σ is in the set S. However,
in Section 3, we give a theorem that says that even Boolean combinations of such sentences are not
sufficiently expressive. Therefore, in Section 2, we define our sentences of choice to be of the form
(σ1, . . . , σk, S) where the σi are formulas, where S is a set of tuples (s1, . . . , sk), and where the
sentence says that if the value of each σi is si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. In Section 4,
we give our axiom (there is only one) and our inference rules. In Section 5, we give our soundness
and completeness theorem. In Section 6, we give a theorem that says that our sentences are closed
1The versions of ∧ and ∨ we describe here are sometimes called in the literature strong conjunction and
strong disjunction. Weak conjunction is given bymin{a1, a2} and weak disjunction is given by max{a1, a2}.
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under Boolean combinations. This helps show robustness of our class of sentences. In Section 7, we
give the decision algorithm. In Section 8, we show how to extend our methodology to incorporate
weights. In the Conclusions, we review the implications for neuro-symbolic approaches.
2 Models and sentences
We assume a finite set of atomic propositions. These can be thought of as the leaves of a neural
net, i.e. nodes with no inputs from other neurons. A modelM is an assignment gM of values to the
atomic propositions. Thus,M assigns a value gM (A) ∈ [0, 1] to each atomic propositionA.
Let F be the set of logical formulas over the atomic propositions, where we allow an arbitrary finite
set of binary connectives and an arbitrary finite set of unary connectives. Typical binary connectives
are conjunction (denoted by∧), disjunction (denoted by∨), and implication (denoted by⇒). Typical
unary connectives are negation (denoted by ¬) and a delta function (denoted by△). Sometimes ¬x
is taken to be 1− x, and△x is taken to be defined by△x = 1 if x = 1 and 0 otherwise.
When considering only formulas with value 1, as other work does when giving sound and complete
axiomatizations of real-valued logics, the convention is to consider a sentence to be simply a member
of F . What if we want to take into account values other than 1? Our first inclination would be to take
a sentence to be an expression of the form (σ, θ), where σ ∈ F and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Here the intuition
is that (σ, θ) says that the value of the formula σ is θ. However, sentences of the form (σ, θ), or
even Boolean combinations of sentences of this form, are not sufficiently expressive. For example,
assume that A1 and A2 are atomic propositions, and consider the sentence (A1 ∨ A2, .5), which
says that the value of A1 ∨ A2 is .5. What does this sentence imply about the value of A1? For
definiteness, assume for now that we are using Gödel logic, where the value of A1 ∨ A2 is the max
of the values of A1 and A2. Then what we can infer from (A1 ∨ A2, .5) about the value of A1 is
that the value of A1 is in the interval [0, .5]. To express that the value of A1 is in the interval [0, .5]
using only formulas of the form (A1, θ) would require an infinite disjunction
∨
θ : θ≤.5(A1, θ). Even
worse, this is not just an infinite disjunction, but an uncountably long infinite disjunction!
This suggests that we allow sentences of the form (σ, S), where S ⊆ [0, 1]. Here the intuition is that
(σ, S) says that the value of the formula σ is in the set S. (In fact, we note that formulas equivalent
to (σ, S) have been considered in the literature [5, 8] in the special case where S is an interval. If S
is the union of intervals S1, . . . , Sk, then (σ, S) can be simulated by (σ, S1)∨ · · · ∨ (σk, Sk).) What
sentences would we infer from the fact that the value ofA1∨A2 is .5, which we would now write as
(A1 ∨A2, {.5})? We could certainly infer the sentences (A1, [0, .5]) and (A2, [0, .5]). But this does
not tell the complete story about what (A1 ∨ A2, {.5}) tells us about the values of A1 and A2. For
example, (A1, [0, .5]) and (A2, [0, .5]) by themselves would allow the values of A1 and A2 to both
be .3, which is not compatible with the sentence (A1 ∨A2, {.5}).
This inspires us to consider a richer class of sentences than those of the form (σ, S). One possibility
is to take a sentence to be a (finite) Boolean combination of sentences (σ, S). In fact, in Gödel real-
valued logic, (A1∨A2, {.5}) is equivalent to the Boolean combination ((A1, {.5})∧ (A2, [0, .5]))∨
((A2, {.5}) ∧ (A1, [0, .5]). However, Theorem 3.2 says that in Łukasiewicz real-valued logic, no
finite Boolean combination of sentences of the form (A1, S) or (A2, S) is equivalent to (A1 ∨
A2, {.5}).
Another possibility to enrich our class of sentences, which is the approach we take in this paper. Let
us consider a sentence of the form (A1, A2, S), which means that if s1 is the value ofA1 and s2 is the
value ofA2, then (s1, s2) ∈ S. Let f∨(s1, s2) be the value of σ1∨σ2 when the value ofA1 is s1 and
the value of A2 is s2. For example, in Łukasiewica real-valued logic, f∨(s1, s2) = min{1, s1+ s2}.
Let S = {(s1, s2) : f∨(s1, s2) = .5}. Then what we can infer from (A1∨A2, {.5}) about the values
of A1 and A2 is exactly the sentence (A1, A2, S).
Therefore, we take a sentence to be an expression of the form (σ1, . . . , σk, S), where σ1, . . . , σk
are in F , and where S ⊆ [0, 1]k. The intuition is that (σ1, . . . , σk, S) says that if the value of each
σi is si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. This class of sentences is robust. In particular, in
Theorem 6.1, we show that this class of sentences is closed under Boolean combinations. We give a
sound and complete axiomatization, that is parameterized to deal with an arbitrary fixed real-valued
logic. This axiomatization allows us to derive exactly what information can be inferred about the
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combinations of values of a collection of formulas given information about the combinations of
values of several other collections of formulas.
For convenience, we assume throughout that in the sentence (σ1, . . . , σk, S), we have that σi and σj
are different formula if i 6= j. We refer to σ1, . . . , σk as the components of (σ1, . . . , σk, S).
Let γ be the sentence (σ1, . . . , σk, S). We now say what it means for a modelM to satisfy γ. For
1 ≤ i ≤ k, let si be the value of the formula σi under the assignment of values to the atomic
propositions given by the modelM . We say that M satisfies γ if (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. We then say
thatM is a model of γ, and we writeM  γ. Note that if (σ1, . . . , σk, S) is satisfiable, that is, has
a model, then S 6= ∅.
3 An inexpressibility result
We begin with a lemma that we use multiple times in this paper.
Lemma 3.1 The (usual, logical) negation of the sentence (σ1, . . . , σk, S) is (σ1, . . . , σk, S˜) where
S˜ is the set difference [0, 1]k \ S.
Proof We need only show that if M is a model, then M  (σ1, . . . , σk, S˜) if and only if M 6
(σ1, . . . , σk, S). Let si be the value of σi in M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If M  (σ1, . . . , σk, S˜), then
(s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S˜, and so (s1, . . . , sk) /∈ S. Hence, M 6 (σ1, . . . , σk, S). Conversely, if M 6
(σ1, . . . , σk, S), then (s1, . . . , sk) /∈ S, and so (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S˜. Hence,M  (σ1, . . . , σk, S˜). 
Theorem 3.2 In Łukasiewicz real-valued logic, no finite Boolean combination of sentences of the
form (A1, S) or (A2, S) is equivalent to (A1 ∨ A2, {.5}).
The proof appears in the supplementary material.
4 Axioms and inference rules
We have only one axiom:
(σ, [0, 1]) (1)
Axiom (1) guarantees that all values are in [0, 1]).
We now give our inference rules.
If pi is a permutation of 1, . . . , k, then:
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σpi(1), . . . , σpi(k), S
′) (2)
where S′ = {(spi(1), . . . , spi(k)) : (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S}.
Rule (2) simply permutes the order of the components.
Our next inference rule is:
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, σk+1, . . . , σm, S × [0, 1]
m−k). (3)
Rule (3) extends (σ1, . . . , σk, S) to include σk+1, . . . , σm with no information being given about
sk+1, . . . , sm.
Our next inference rule is:
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S1) and (σ1, . . . , σk, S2) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S1 ∩ S2). (4)
Rule (4) enables us to combine the information in (σ1, . . . , σk, S1) and (σ1, . . . , σk, S2).
Our next inference rule is the following (where 0 < r < k):
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk−r , S
′) (5)
where S′ = {(s1, . . . , sk−r) : (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S}.
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Intuitively, S′ is the projection of S onto the first k − r components. Rule (5) enables us to infer
information about σ1, . . . , σk−r from information about σ1, . . . , σk.
Our next inference rule is:
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) if S ⊆ S′. (6)
Rule (6) says that we can go from more information to less information.
We now give an inference rule that depends on the real-valued logic under consideration. For each
real-valued binary connective α, let fα(s1, s2) be the value of σ1 ασ2 when the value of σ1 is s1
and the value of σ2 is s2. For example, in Gödel logic, f∧(s1, s2) = min{s1, s2}. For each real-
valued unary connective ρ, let fρ(s) be the value of ρσ when the value of σ is s. For example, in
Łukasiewicz logic, f¬(s) = 1− s.
We then have the following inference rule:
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) (7)
where S′ = {(s1, . . . , sk) : (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S and (a) fα(si, sj) = sm when σm is σi ασj and α is a
binary connective (such as ∧), and (b) fρ(si) = sj when σj is ρσi and ρ is a unary connective (such
as ¬)}.
Of course, if the real-valued logic under consideration has higher-order connectives (ternary, etc.),
then we would augment Rule (7) in the obvious way. For simplicity, we will assume throughout this
paper that we are in the common case where the only connectives are unary and binary, although all
of our results go through in the general case.
Rule (7) is our key rule of inference. Let γ1 be the premise (σ1, . . . , σk, S) and let γ2 be the
conclusion (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) of Rule (7). As we shall discuss later, γ1 and γ2 are logically equivalent,
and S′ is as small as possible so that γ1 and γ2 are logically equivalent.
Each of our rules is of the form “From A infer B” or “From A infer B where ...”. We refer to A as
the premise and B as the conclusion. We need the notion of a subformula of a formula. If α is a
binary connective, then the subformulas of σ1 ασ2 are σ1 and σ2. If ρ is a unary connective, then
the subformula of ρσ is σ.
Let Γ be a set of our sentences. We define the closureG of Γ under subformulas as follows. The set
G contains every member of Γ, every subformula of every member of Γ, every subformula of every
subformula of every member of Γ, and so on. In particular,G contains every atomic proposition that
appears inside the components of Γ.
5 Soundness and completeness
Let Γ be a finite set of sentences, and let γ be a single sentence. We write Γ  γ if every model of Γ
is a model of γ. We write Γ ⊢ γ if there is a proof of γ from Γ, using our axiom system. Soundness
says “Γ ⊢ γ implies Γ  γ”. Completeness says “Γ  γ implies Γ ⊢ γ”.
We now state our main theorem.
Theorem 5.1 Our axiom system is sound and complete for sentences of the form (σ1, . . . , σk, S).
We give the proof of this completeness theorem in our supplementary material. We now describe
the key step. We define a special property of certain sentences, that is used in a crucial manner
in our completeness proof. Let us say that a sentence (σ1, . . . , σk, S) is minimized if whenever
(s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S, then there is a modelM of (σ1, . . . , σk, S) such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the value of
σi inM is si. Thus, (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S if and only if there is a modelM of (σ1, . . . , σk, S) such that
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the value of σi inM is si. We use the word “minimized”, since intuitively, S is as
small as possible.
Our proof of completeness makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2 Let (σ1, . . . , σk, S) be the premise of Rule (7). Assume that G = {σ1, . . . , σk} is
closed under subformulas (so that in particular, every atomic proposition that appears in G is a
member of G). Then the conclusion (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) of Rule (7) is minimized.
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Proof Let ϕ be the conclusion (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) of Rule (7). Assume that (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S′. To
prove that ϕ is minimized, we must show that there is a modelM of ϕ such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the
value of σi inM is si. From the assignment of values to the atomic propositions, as specified by a
portion of (s1, . . . , sk), we obtain our modelM . For this modelM , the value of each σi is exactly
that specified by (s1, . . . , sk), as we can see by a simple induction on the structure of formulas.
Hence, ϕ is minimized. 
The proof also uses the following lemma, that we shall refer to later.
Lemma 5.3 For each of Rules (2), (3), (4), and (7), the premise and the conclusion are logically
equivalent.
Proof The equivalence of the premise and conclusion of Rule (2) is clear. For Rules (3), (4), and (7),
the fact that the premise logically implies the conclusion follows from soundness of the rules, which
we shall show shortly. We now show that for Rules (3), (4), and (7), the conclusion logically implies
the premise. For Rule (3), we see that if (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ S × [0, 1]m−k, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S.
Hence, the conclusion of Rule (3) logically implies the premise of Rule (3). For Rules (4) and (7),
the conclusion logically implies the premise because of the soundness of Rule (6). 
6 Closure of our sentences under Boolean combinations
Our next theorem implies that our sentences are robust, in that they are closed under Boolean com-
binations.
Theorem 6.1 Our sentences (σ1, . . . , σk, S) are closed under Boolean combinations.
This theorem’s proof, although short, requires machinery that is in the proof of Theorem 5.1, so we
give the proof in the supplementary material.
7 SoCRAtic logic: A decision procedure
Given a finite set Γ of our sentences, and a single sentence γ, Theorem 5.1 says that Γ  γ if and
only if Γ ⊢ γ. As we shall show, under natural assumptions there is an algorithm for deciding if
Γ  γ. We call this algorithm a decision procedure. Under certain restrictions, it is polynomial-time.
It is natural to wonder whether we can simply use our complete axiomatization to derive a decision
procedure. The usual answer is that it is not clear in what order to apply the rules of inference. In
our proof of completeness, the rules of inference are applied in a specific order, so that is not an
issue here. Rather, the problem is that in applying Rule (7), there is no easy way to derive S′ from
S, even if S is fairly simple. In fact, we now show that even deciding if S′ is nonempty is NP-hard.
Let ϕ be an instance of the NP-hard problem 3SAT. Thus, ϕ is of the form (B11 ∨B
1
2 ∨B
1
3) ∧ · · · ∧
(Br1 ∨B
r
2 ∨B
r
3), where each B
i
j is a literal (an atomic proposition or its negation). Assume that the
atomic propositions that appear in ϕ are A1, . . . , Ak. Let ψ be the sentence
(A1, . . . , Ak,¬A1, . . . ,¬Ak, τ1, . . . , τr, τ1 ∨B
1
3 , . . . , τr ∨B
r
3 , S),
where τi is B
i
1 ∨ B
i
2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and where S = {0, 1}
2k+r × {1}r. Assume that we apply
Rule (7) where the premise is ψ, and the conclusion is
(A1, . . . , Ak,¬A1, . . . ,¬Ak, τ1, . . . , τr, τ1 ∨B
1
3 , . . . , τr ∨B
r
3 , S
′).
We call this sentence ψ′. It follows easily from our construction of ψ that the 3SAT problem ϕ is
satisfiable if and only if ψ is satisfiable. Now ψ and ψ′ are logically equivalent, by Lemma 5.3. So
the 3SAT problem ϕ is satisfiable if and only if ψ′ is satisfiable. By Lemma 5.2, we know that ψ′ is
minimized. Hence, if S′ is nonempty, there is a model of ψ′, by the definition of minimization. And
if S′ is empty, then by the definition of a model of a sentence, there is no model of ψ′. Therefore, ψ′
is satisfiable if and only if S′ is nonempty. By combining this with our earlier observation that the
3SAT problem ϕ is satisfiable if and only if ψ′ is satisfiable, it follows that the 3SAT problem ϕ is
satisfiable if and only if S′ is nonempty. Hence, deciding if S′ is nonempty is NP-hard.
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We now discuss our decision procedure. To have a chance of there being a decision procedure,
the set portion S of our sentences (σ1, . . . , σk, S) must be tractable. We now give a simple, nat-
ural choice for the set portions. A rational interval is a subset of [0, 1] that is of one of the four
forms (a, b), [a, b], (a, b], or [a, b), where a and b are rational numbers. Let us say that a sentence
(σ1, . . . , σk, S) is interval-based if S is of the form S1 × · · · × Sk, where each Si is a union of
rational intervals. If each Si is the union of at most N rational intervals, then we say that the sen-
tence isN -interval-based. Note that this interval-based sentence (σ1, . . . , σk, S) is equivalent to the
set {(σ1, S1), . . . , (σk, Sk)} of sentences with only one component each. This observation may be
useful in implementing a decision procedure such as ours.
Let Γ = {γ1, . . . , γn}. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, assume that γi is (σi1, . . . , σ
i
ki
, Si), and let Γi =
{σi1, . . . , σ
i
ki
}. Assume that γ is (σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
, S0), and let Γ0 = {σ
0
1 , . . . , σ
0
k0
}. Let G be the
closure of Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Γn under subformulas. If |G| ≤ M , then we say that the pair (Γ, γ) has
nesting depth at mostM .
Theorem 7.1 Assume either Łukasiewicz logic or Gödel logic, with the connective ∧, ∨, ⇒, and
¬.2 Assume that Γ ∪ {γ} is interval based. Then there is an algorithm that determines whether
Γ  γ. If M , N , and P are fixed, and Γ has at most P sentences, each sentence in Γ ∪ {γ} is
N -interval based, and (Γ, γ) has nesting depth at mostM , then the algorithm is polynomial-time.
We give the proof of this theorem in our supplementary material. We now give a sketch of the proof.
It is easy to see that Γ  γ if and only Γ∪{¬γ} is not satisfiable. So we need only give a polynomial-
time algorithm that decides whether Γ ∪ {¬γ} is satisfiable.
It follows form Lemma 3.1 ¬γ is (N+1)-interval based. Let {σ1, . . . , σp} be the closure of Γ∪{γ}
under subformulas. It follows from applying Rules (2), (3), and (4) and using Lemma 5.3 that
Γ ∪ {¬γ} is equivalent to an interval-based sentence τ of the form (σ1, . . . , σp, S1 × · · · × Sp).
The problem of deciding if τ is satisfiable can be broken into |S1| × · · · × |Sp| subproblems, one
for each choice (I1, . . . , Ip) of a single interval Ik from Sk for each k with 1 ≤ k ≤ p. For each
of these subproblems, we wish to decide satisfiability of the system {s1 ∈ I1, . . . , sp ∈ Ip} along
with (a) the binary constraints fα(si, sj) = sm when σm is σi ασj and α is a ∧, ∨, or⇒, and (b)
f¬(si) = sj when σj is ¬σi. Then τ is satisfiable if and only if at least one of these is satisfiable.
The constraints sj ∈ Ij are specified by inequalities (for example, if Ij is (a, b] we get the inequal-
ities a < si ≤ b). We now show how to deal with the constraints in (a) and (b) above. A typical
example is given by dealingwith f∧(si, sj) = sm in Gödel logic, which interprets “f∧(si, sj) = sm”
asmin{si, sj} = sm. We split the system of constraints into two systems of constraints, one where
we replace min{si, sj} = sm by the two statements “si ≤ sj , si = sm” and another where we
replace min{si, sj} = sm by the two statements “sj < si, sj = sm”. The same method works in
general for all Gödel and Łukasiewicz operators. In considering the effect of the constraints in (a)
and (b), each of our subproblems splits at most 2p ≤ 2M times, each giving a systems of inequalities
that we need to check for feasibility (that is, to see if there is a solution). For each of these systems
of inequalities, we can use a polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming to decide feasibility.
SinceM ,N , and P are constants by assumption, this gives us an overall polynomial-time algorithm
for decidability. This concludes the sketch of the proof of Theorem 7.1.
The reason we held the parametersM , N , and P fixed is that the running time of the algorithm is
exponential in the parameters, because there are an exponential number of calls to a linear program-
ming subroutine. The algorithm is polynomial-time if there is a fixed bound on the parameters. Such
a bound is necessary, because the problem can be co-NP hard, for the following reason.
Let γ be the sentence (A,¬A, [1] × [1]). Then γ is not satisfiable. Let Γ consist of the single
sentence ψ from the beginning of the section. Then Γ  γ if and only if ψ is not satisfiable. Now
ψ is satisfiable if and only if S′ from the beginning of the section is nonempty, which we showed
is an NP-hard problem to determine. Since Γ  γ if and only if ψ is not satisfiable, it follows that
deciding if Γ  γ is co-NP hard.
2For Łukasiewicz logic, we could allow each of strong and weak disjunction and conjunction, respectively,
as described in Footnote 1.
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8 Dealing with weights
In some circumstances, such as logical neural networks [11], weights are assigned to subformulas,
where the weight is intended to reflect the influence, or importance, of the subformula. Each weight
is a real number. For example, in the formulas σ1 ∨ σ2, the weight w1 might be assigned to σ1 and
the weight w2 assigned to σ2. If 0 < w1 = 2w2, this might indicate that σ1 is twice as important as
σ2 in evaluating the value of σ1 ∨ σ2.
As an example of a possible way to incorporate weights, assume that we are using Łukasiewicz
real-valued logic, where the value of σ1 ∨ σ2 is min{1, s1 + s2}, when s1 is the value of σ1 and
s2 is the value of s2. If the weights of σ1 and σ2 are w1 and w2, respectively, and if both w1 and
w2 are non-negative, then we might take the value of σ1 ∨ σ2 in the presence of these weights to be
min{1, w1s1 + w2s2}.
We now show how to incorporate weights into our approach. In fact, the ease of incorporating
weights and still getting a sound and complete axiomatization is a real advantage of our approach!
To deal with weights, we define an expanded view of what a formula is, defined recursively. Each
atomic proposition is a formula. If σ1 and σ2 are formulas,w1 and w2 are weights, and α is a binary
connective (such as ∧) then (σ1 ασ2, w1, w2) is a formula. Here w1 is interpreted as the weight of
σ1 and w2 as the weight of σ2 in the formula σ1 ασ2. Also, if σ is a formula, w is a weight, and ρ
is a unary connective (such as ¬), then (ρσ,w) is a formula, where w is interpreted as the weight of
σ. We modify our definition of subformula as follows. The subformulas of (σ1 ασ2, w1, w2) are σ1
and σ2, and the subformula of (ρσ,w) is σ in ρσ.
If α is a binary connective, then fα now has four arguments, rather than two. Thus, fα(s1, s2, w,w2)
is the value of the formula (σ1 ασ2, w1, w2) when the value of σ1 is s1, the value of σ2 is s2, the
weight of σ1 is w1, and the weight of σ2 in w2. Also, fρ now has two arguments rather than one.
Thus, fρ(s, w) is the value of the formula (ρσ,w) when the value of σ is s, and the weight of σ is
w.
The axiom and rules are just as before, except that Rule (7) is changed to:
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) (8)
where S′ = {(s1, . . . , sk) : (s1, . . . , sk,∈ S and (a) fα(si, sj , w1, w2) = sm when σm is
(σi ασj , w,w2) and α is a binary connective, and (b) fρ(si, w) = sj when σj is (ρσi, w) and ρ
is a unary connective}.
We can extend Theorem 5.1 (soundness and completeness) and Theorem 6.1 (closure under Boolean
combinations) to deal with our sentences (σ1, . . . , σk, S) that include weights. The proofs go
through just as before, where we use Rule (8) instead of Rule (7). Thus, we obtain the following
theorems.
Theorem 8.1 Our axiom system where Rule (7) is replaced by Rule (8) is sound and complete for
sentences of the form (σ1, . . . , σk, S) that include weights.
Theorem 8.2 Our sentences (σ1, . . . , σk, S) that include weights are closed under Boolean combi-
nations.
What about the decision procedure in Theorem 7.1? The key step at the end of the proof is the
use of a polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming. It we were to hold the weights wi as
fixed rational constants, and if the weighting functions were linear (such as w1s1 + w2s2), possibly
including a min or a max, then we could use linear programming, and the decision procedure would
go through in the presence of weights.
9 Conclusions
To our knowledge and to the knowledge of experts we consulted in the field, we establish the first
foundations for real-valued logical inference on formulas with intermediate truth values, analogous
to basic notions of logical correctness and power for classical logic. The results give us a way to
establish such properties for neuro-symbolic systems that aim or purport to perform logical inference
with real values. The algorithm described gives us a constructive existence proof and a baseline
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approach for well-founded inference. Because LNNs [11] are exactly a weighted real-valued logical
system implemented in neural network form, an important immediate upshot of the results for the
weighted case is that they provide provably sound and complete logical inference for LNNs. Such
a result has not previously been established for any neuro-symbolic approach to our knowledge.
While our main motivation was to pave the way forward for neuro-symbolic systems, the results are
fundamental, filling a long-standing gap in a very old literature, and can be applied well beyond AI.
Broader Impact
This work is a step in the direction of explainable AI as it pertains to logical inference in neural
networks. This may ultimately assist in preventing unfair, unwarranted, or otherwise undesirable
outcomes from the application of modern AI methods.
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Supplementary material for “Foundations of
Reasoning with Uncertainty via Real-valued Logics”
A Proof of Theorem 3.2
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 In Łukasiewicz real-valued logic, no finite Boolean combination of sentences of the
form (A1, S) or (A2, S) is equivalent to (A1 ∨ A2, {.5}).
Assume there is such a Boolean combination ϕ; we shall derive a contradiction. Let us write ϕ in
disjunctive normal form
∨
i ϕi, where each ϕ is a conjunction of sentences of the form (A1, S) or
(A2, S) or their negations. We assume without loss of generality that each ϕi is satisfiable, since
otherwise it can be discarded. For now let us fix i, and focus on a fixed ϕi. In ϕi, consider (a) all
the non-negated conjuncts (A1, S1), . . . , (A1, Sm) that involve A1, and (b) the negated conjuncts
¬(A1, T1), . . . ,¬(A1, Tn) that involveA1. Let V1 be the intersection S1 ∩ · · · ∩Sm ∩ T˜1 ∩ · · · ∩ T˜n,
where T˜j is the set difference [0, 1]\Ti (whichwe use because of Lemma 3.1 in the body of the paper).
Similarly, construct V2 for the conjuncts that involveA2. The ϕi is equivalent to (A1, V1)∧(A2, V2).
Sinceϕ is equivalent to (A1∨A2, {.5}), it follows thatϕi logically implies (A1∨A2, {.5}). Since by
assumption ϕi is satisfiable, necessarily V1 and V2 are nonempty. Assume that a1 ∈ V1 and a2 ∈ V2.
Then by definition of ∨ in Łukasiewicz logic, we know that a1 + a2 = .5. If V1 were to contain
another member a′1 other than a1, we would have a
′
1 + a2 = .5, so a1 = a
′
1, a contradiction. Hence
V1 and V2 each contain exactly one member. Let us write (A1, {a1}) as A1 = a1 and similarly for
A2. Then each disjunct ϕi of ϕ is equivalent to a formulaA1 = a
i
1∧A2 = a
i
2. Hence ϕ is equivalent
to the finite disjunction ∨i(A1 = ai1 ∧ A2 = a
i
2). But then ϕ is not equivalent to (A1 ∨ A2, {.5}),
since there are infinitely many pairs (a1, a2) such that a1 + a2 = .5. This is a contradiction. 
B Proof of Theorem 5.1
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 Our axiom system is sound and complete for sentences of the form (σ1, . . . , σk, S).
Recall for convenience that the axioms and rules of inference are as follows.
We have only one axiom:
(σ, [0, 1]) (1)
The inference rules are:
If pi is a permutation of 1, . . . , k, then from (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σpi(1), . . . , σpi(k), S
′) (2)
where S′ = {(spi(1), . . . , σpi(k)) : (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S}.
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, σk+1, . . . , σm, S × [0, 1]
m−k). (3)
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S1) and (σ1, . . . , σk, S2) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S1 ∩ S2). (4)
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If 0 < r < k, then from (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk−r, S
′) (5)
where S′ = {(s1, . . . , sk−r) : (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S}.
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) if S ⊆ S′. (6)
From (σ1, . . . , σk, S) infer (σ1, . . . , σk, S
′) (7)
where S′ = {(s1, . . . , sk) : (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S and (a) fα(si, sj) = sm when σm is σi ασj and α is a
binary connective (such as ∧), and (b) fρ(si) = sj when σj is ρσi and ρ is a unary connective (such
as ¬)}.
Before we prove Theorem 5.1, we need another lemma.
Lemma B.1 Minimization is preserved by Rules (2) and (4), in the following sense.
1. If the premise of Rule (2) is minimized, then so is the conclusion.
2. If the premises (σ1, . . . , σk, S1) and (σ1, . . . , σk, S2) of Rule (4) are minimized, then so is
the conclusion (σ1, . . . , σk, S1 ∩ S2.
Proof Part (1) is immediate, since the premise and conclusion have exactly the same information.
For part (2), assume that (σ1, . . . , σk, S1) and (σ1, . . . , σk, S2) are minimized. To show that
(σ1, . . . , σk, S1 ∩ S2) is minimized, we must show that if (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S1 ∩ S2, then there is
a modelM of (σ1, . . . , σk, S1 ∩ S2) such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the value of σi in M is si. Assume
that (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S1 ∩ S2. Hence, (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S1. Since (σ1, . . . , σk, S1) is minimized, we
obtain the desired modelM . 
We now give our proof of Theorem 5.1.
We begin by proving soundness. We say that an axiom is sound if it is true in every model. We say
that an inference rule is sound if every model that satisfies the premise also satisfies the conclusion.
To prove soundness of our axiom system, it is sufficient to show that our axiom is sound and that
each of our rules is sound.
Axiom (1) is sound, since every real-valued logic formula has a value in [0, 1].
Rule (2) is sound, since the premise and conclusion encode exactly the same information.
Rule (3) is sound for the following reason. LetM be a model, and let s1, . . . , sm be the values of
σ1, . . . , σm, respectively, inM . IfM satisfies the premise, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. This implies that
(s1, . . . , sm) ∈ S × [0, 1]m−k) and soM satisfies the conclusion.
Rule (4) is sound for the following reason. Let M be a model, and let s1, . . . , sk be the val-
ues of σ1, . . . , σk, respectively, in M . If M satisfies the premise, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S1 and
(s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S2. Therefore, (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S1 ∩ S2, and soM satisfies the conclusion.
Rule (5) is sound for the following reason. Let M be a model, and let s1, . . . , sk be the values
of σ1, . . . , σk, respectively, in M . If M satisfies the premise, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. Therefore
(s1, . . . , sk−r) ∈ S′, and soM satisfies the conclusion.
Rule (6) is sound for the following reason. Let M be a model, and let s1, . . . , sk be the values
of σ1, . . . , σk , respectively, in M . If M satisfies the premise, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. Therefore,
(s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S′, and soM satisfies the conclusion.
Rule (7) is sound for the following reason. LetM be a model, and let s1, . . . , sk be the values of
σ1, . . . , σk, respectively, inM . IfM satisfies the premise, then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S. In our real-valued
logic, we have that (a) fα(si, sj) = sm when σm is σi ασj and α is a binary connective (such as ∧),
and (b) fρ(si) = sj when σj is ρσi and ρ is a unary connective (such as ¬). Then (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S′,
andM satisfies the conclusion.
This completes the proof of soundness. We now prove completeness. Assume that Γ  γ; we must
show that Γ ⊢ γ. We can assume without loss of generality that Γ is nonempty, because if Γ is
empty, we replace it by a singleton set containing an instance of our Axiom (1).
11
Let Γ = {γ1, . . . , γn}. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, assume that γi is (σi1, . . . , σ
i
ki
, Si), and let Γi =
{σi1, . . . , σ
i
ki
}. Assume that γ is (σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
, S0), and let Γ0 = {σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
}. Let G be the
closure of Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Γn under subformulas.
For each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, letHi be the set differenceG \Γi. Let ri = |Hi|. LetHi = {τ i1, . . . τ
i
ri
}.
By applying Rule (3), we prove from γi the sentence (σ
i
1, . . . , σ
i
ki
, τ i1, . . . , τ
i
ri
, Si × [0, 1]ri). Let ψi
be the conclusion of Rule (7) when the premise is (σi1, . . . , σ
i
ki
, τ i1, . . . , τ
i
ri
, Si × [0, 1]
ri).
Let δ1, . . . , δp be a fixed ordering of the members of G. Since the set of components of each ψi is
G, we can use Rule (2) to rewrite ψi as a sentence (δ1, . . . , δp, Ti). Let us call this sentence ϕi.
Also, since the only rules used in proving ϕi from γi are Rules (2), (3), and (7), it follows from
Lemma 5.3 in the body of the paper that γi and ϕi are logically equivalent.
We now make use of the notion of minimization, as defined at the beginning of Section 5 in the body
of the paper.
Let T = T1 ∩ · · · ∩ Tn. Define ϕ to be the sentence (δ1, . . . , δp, T ). It follows from Lemma 5.2
in the body of the paper that each ψi is minimized. So by Lemma B.1, each ϕi is minimized. By
Lemma B.1 again, ϕ is minimized.
The sentenceϕwas obtained from the sentencesϕi by applying Rule (4) n−1 times. It follows from
Lemma 5.3 in the body of the paper that ϕ is equivalent to {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}. Since we also showed that
γi is logically equivalent to ϕi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it follows that ϕ is logically equivalent to Γ. Hence,
since Γ  γ, it follows that {ϕ}  γ. It also follows that to prove that Γ ⊢ γ, we need only show
that there is a proof of γ from ϕ.
Recall that γ is (σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
, S0), and ϕ is (δ1, . . . , δp, T ). By applying Rule (2), we can re-order
the components of ϕ so that the components start with σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
. We thereby obtain from ϕ a
sentence (σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
, . . . , T ′), which we denote by ϕ′. By Lemma 5.3 in the body of the paper
we know that ϕ and ϕ′ are logically equivalent. So {ϕ′}  γ. Since ϕ is minimized, so is ϕ′,
by Lemma B.1. By applying Rule (5), we obtain from ϕ′ a sentence (σ01 , . . . , σ
0
k0
, T ′′), which we
denote by ϕ′′.
We now show that T ′′ ⊆ S0. This is sufficient to complete the proof of completeness, since then we
can use Rule (6) to prove γ. If T ′′ is empty, we are done. So assume that (s1, . . . , sk0) ∈ T
′′; we
must show that (s1, . . . , sk0) ∈ S0.
Since (s1, . . . , sk0) ∈ T
′′, it follows that there is an extension (s1, . . . , sk0 , . . . , sp) in T
′. Since
ϕ′ is minimized, there is a modelM of ϕ′ such that the value of σ0i is si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k0. Since
{ϕ′}  γ, it follows thatM is a model of γ. By definition of what it means forM to be a model of
γ, it follows that (s1, . . . , sk0) ∈ S0, as desired.
This completes the proof of soundness and completeness. 
C Proof of Theorem 6.1
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1 Our sentences (σ1, . . . , σk, S) are closed under Boolean combinations.
Let γ1 and γ2 be sentences. Assume that γ1 is (σ
1
1 , . . . , σ
1
m, S1), and that γ2 is (σ
2
1 , . . . , σ
2
n, S2). As
in the proof of Theorem 5.1, let G be the closure of {σ11 , . . . , σ
1
m, σ
2
1 , . . . , σ
2
n} under subformulas.
Assume that G = {δ1, . . . , δp}. As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we know that for i = 1 and
i = 2, there is Ti such that γi is equivalent to a sentence (δ1, . . . , δp, Ti). The conjunction γ1 ∧ γ2
is equivalent to (δ1, . . . , δp, T1 ∩ T2). The disjunction γ1 ∨ γ2 is equivalent to (δ1, . . . , δp, T1 ∪ T2).
And by Lemma 3.1 in the body of the paper, the negation¬γ1 is equivalent to (δ1, . . . , δp, T˜i), where
T˜1 is the set difference [0, 1]
p \ T1. 
D Proof of Theorem 7.1
We prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 7.1 Assume either Łukasiewicz logic or Gödel logic, with the connective ∧, ∨,⇒, and ¬.
Assume that Γ ∪ {γ} is interval based. Then there is an algorithm that determines whether Γ  γ.
IfM , N , and P are fixed, and Γ has at most P sentences, each sentence in Γ ∪ {γ} is N -interval
based, and (Γ, γ) has nesting depth at mostM , then the algorithm is polynomial-time.
Assume throughout the proof that Γ has at most P sentences, each sentence in Γ∪{γ} isN -interval
based, and (Γ, γ) has nesting depth at mostM .
It is easy to see that Γ  γ if and only Γ∪{¬γ} is not satisfiable. So we need only give a polynomial-
time algorithm that decides whether Γ ∪ {¬γ} is satisfiable.
Let {σ1, . . . , σp} be the closure of Γ ∪ {γ} under subformulas. Let Γ = {γ1, . . . , γn}. By mak-
ing use of Rules (2) and (3), for each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can create a sentence γ′i of the
form (σ1, . . . , σp, S
i) that by Lemma 5.3 in the body of the paper is equivalent to γi, and that has
σ1, . . . , σp as components. By the construction, each γ
′
i is N -interval-based.
Similarly, create the sentence γ′ of the form (σ1, . . . , σp, T ) that is equivalent to γ, and that has
σ1, . . . , σp as components. As before, γ
′ is N -interval-based.
Now Γ is equivalent to the conjunction of the sentences γ′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and this conjunction
is equivalent to (σ1, . . . , σp, S), where S =
⋂
i≤n S
i. We now show that (σ1, . . . , σp, S) is PN -
interval-based. By assumption, for each iwith 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that Si is of the formSi1×· · ·×S
i
p,
where each Sij is the union of at mostN intervals. For each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ p, let Sj =
⋂
i S
i
j . Then
S = S1 × · · · × Sp. So to show that (σ1, . . . , σp, S) is PN -interval-based, we need only show that
each Sj is the union of at most PN intervals.
Since Sj =
⋂
i≤n S
i
j , where each S
i
j is the union of at mostN intervals, we see that Sj is the union
of intervals where the left endpoint of each interval in Sj is one of the left endpoints of intervals in⋃
i≤n S
i
j . For each j, there are n sets S
i
j . And for each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there are at most N left
endpoints of Sij . So the total number of left endpoints of intervals in
⋃
i≤n S
i
j is at most nN ≤ PN ,
and so the number of intervals in Sj is at most PN . Since S = S1 × · · · × Sp, it follows that
(σ1, . . . , σp, S) is PN -interval-based.
Let us now consider ¬γ, which is equivalent to ¬γ′. Recall that γ′ is (σ1, . . . , σp, T ), and that γ′
is N -interval-based. So T is of the form T1 × · × Tp, where each Tj is the union of at most N
intervals. By Lemma 3.1 in the body of the paper, the negation of γ′ is (σ1, . . . , σp, T˜ ), where T˜
is the set difference [0, 1]p \ T . For each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ p, let T ′j be the set difference [0, 1] \ Tj .
Clearly, T ′j is the union of intervals. The left endpoints of intervals in T
′
j are the right-end points
of intervals in Tj , possible along with 0. So T
′
j is the union of at most N + 1 intervals. Let
Vj = [0, 1]
j−1 × T ′j × [0, 1]
p−j . It is straightforward to see that T˜ =
⋃
j≤p Vj .
Now, showing that Γ ∪ {¬γ} is not satisfiable is equivalent to showing that (σ1, . . . , σp, S) ∧
(σ1, . . . , σp, T˜ ) is not satisfiable, which is equivalent to showing that for every j with 1 ≤ j ≤ p, we
have that (σ1, . . . , σp, S)∧ (σ1, . . . , σp, Vj) is not satisfiable. So we need only give an algorithm for
deciding if (σ1, . . . , σp, S)∧(σ1, . . . , σp, Vj) is satisfiable. Let us hold j fixed. Since, as we showed,
(σ1, . . . , σp, S) is PN -interval-based, we can write S as S1×· · ·×Sp, where each Si is the union of
at most PN intervals. Now (σ1, . . . , σp, S)∧ (σ1, . . . , σp, Vj) is equivalent to (σ1, . . . , σp, S ∩ Vj).
Now S ∩ Vj is of the form S′1 × · · · × S
′
p, where S
′
m = Sm for m 6= j, and where S
′
j = Sj ∩ T
′
j .
We showed that T ′j is the union of at most N + 1 intervals, and that Sj is the union of at most PN
intervals, so it follows that Sj ∩ T ′j is the union of at most PN + N + 1 intervals, since each left
endpoint of the intervals in Sj ∩ T ′j is a left endpoint of an interval in Sj or an interval in T
′
j .
We now describe our algorithm for deciding if the sentence (σ1, . . . , σp, S ∩ Vj), that is, for the
sentence (σ1, . . . , σp, S
′
1×· · ·×S
′
p), which is (PN +N+1)-interval-based, is satisfiable. This can
be broken into |S′1|× · · ·× |S
′
p| subproblems, one for each choice (I1, . . . , Ip) of a single interval Ik
from S′k for each k with 1 ≤ k ≤ p. This gives a total of at most (PN+N +1)
M subproblems. For
each of these subproblems, we wish to decide satisfiability of the system {s1 ∈ I1, . . . , sp ∈ Ip}
along with (a) the binary constraints fα(si, sj) = sm when σm is σi ασj and α is a ∧, ∨, or⇒, and
(b) f¬(si) = sj when σj is ¬σi.
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The constraints sj ∈ Ij are specified by inequalities (for example, if Ij is (a, b] we get the in-
equalities a < si ≤ b). We now show how to deal with the constraints in (a) and (b) above.
A canonical example is given by dealing with f∧(si, sj) = sm in Gödel logic, which interprets
“f∧(si, sj) = sm” as min{si, sj} = sm. We split the system of constraints into two systems of
constraints, one where we replace min{si, sj} = sm by the two statements “si ≤ sj , si = sm”
and another where we replace min{si, sj} = sm by the two statements “sj < si, sj = sm”. In
Łukasiewicz logic, where f∧(si, sj) ismax{0, s1 + s2 − 1}, we split the system of constraints into
two systems of constraints, one where we replacemax{0, s1+ s2− 1} = sm by the two statements
“si + sj − 1 ≥ 0, si + sj − 1 = sm” and another where we replace max{0, s1 + s2 − 1} = sm
by the two statements “si + sj − 1 < 0, sm = 0”. The same approach works for the other binary
connectives. For example, in Gödel logic, where f⇒(si, sj) is 1 if si ≤ sj and is sj otherwise, we
would split into two case, one where we replace f⇒(si, sj) = sm by the two statements “si ≤ sj ,
sm = 1” and another where we replace f⇒(si, sj) = sm by the two statements “sj > si, sm = sj”.
In considering the effect of the constraints in (a) and (b), each of our at most (PN + N + 1)M
subproblems splits at most 2p ≤ 2M times, giving a grand total of at most (PN + N + 1)M2M
systems of inequalities that we need to check for feasibility (that is, to see if there is a solution).
For each of these systems of inequalities, we can make use a polynomial-time algorithm for linear
programming to decide feasibility. SinceM , N , and P are constants by assumption, this gives us
an overall polynomial-time algorithm for decidability. 
E Implementation of the decision procedure
The decision procedure described in Section 7 is available under the socratic-logic subdirectory
provided with this supplementary material. We implemented the algorithm as a Python package
named socratic, which requires Python 3.6 or 3.7 and makes use of IBM R© ILOG R© CPLEX R©
Optimization Studio V12.10.0 via the docplex Python package.
E.1 Source code organization
The source code is organized as follows:
setup.sh A script to create a Python virtualenv and install required pack-
ages
requirements.txt A standard pip list of package dependencies
socratic/theory.py Implementations for theories, sentences, and bounded intervals
socratic/op.py Implementations for each logical operator as well as propositions
and truth value constants
socratic/demo.py Two example use cases demonstrating the use of the package
socratic/test.py A suite of unit tests also serving as our experimental setup
socratic/hajek.py Many tautologies proved in [7] used in test.py
socratic/clock.py A higher-order function to measure the runtime of experiments
The classes defined in the source code are:
theory.Theory A collection of sentences that can test for satisfiability or the entailment of a
query sentence under a given logic
theory.Sentence A base-class for a collection of formulas and an associated set of candidate
interpretations for the formulas
theory.SimpleSentence A single formula and an associated collection of candi-
date truth value intervals for the formula
theory.FloatInterval An open or closed interval of truth values
theory.ClosedInterval [l, u], i.e. all values from l to u, inclusive
theory.Point [x, x], i.e. just x
theory.OpenInterval (l, u), i.e. all values from l to u, exclusive
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theory.OpenLowerInterval (l, u], i.e. all values from l to u excluding l
theory.OpenUpperInterval [l, u), i.e. all values from l to u excluding u
op.Formula The base-class of a data structure representing the syntax tree of a logical formula
op.Prop A named proposition, e.g. x
op.Constant A truth value constant, e.g. .5
op.Operator The base-class of all formulas with subformulas
op.And Strong conjunction x⊗ y
op.WeakAnd Weak conjunction x ∧ y = min{x, y}
op.Or Strong disjunction x⊗ y
op.WeakOr Weak disjunction x ∨ y = max{x, y}
op.Implies Implication x⇒ y defined as the residuum of ⊗
op.Not Negation defined ¬x = (x⇒ 0)
op.Inv Involute negation∼x = 1− x
op.Equiv Logical equivalence (x ≡ y) = ((x⇒ y)⊗ (y ⇒ x))
op.Delta The Delta operation∆x = 1 if x = 1 else 0
E.2 Implementation details
The implementation strategy closely adheres to the decision procedure described in Section 7,
though with a few notable design shortcuts.
Boolean variables. One such shortcut is the use of mixed integer linear programming (MILP) to
perform the “spliting” of linear programs into two possible optimization problems, specifically by
adding a Boolean variable that determines which of a set of constraints must be active. For example,
given the desired constraint z = min{x, y}, one may write
z ≤ x (9)
z ≤ y (10)
z ≥ x− (1− b) (11)
y ≥ x− (1− b) (12)
z ≥ y − b (13)
x ≥ y − b (14)
for Boolean variable b. For x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], observe that (11) and (12) are effectively disabled for
b = 0 and that (13) and (14) are likewise disabled for b = 1. For example, when b = 1, the
remaining constraints are z ≤ x, z ≤ y, z ≥ x, y ≥ x, which is equivalent to z = x, x ≤ y, as
desired. Observe then that MILP’s exploration of either value for the Boolean variable is equivalent
to repeating linear optimization for either possible set of constraints; no feasible solution exists for
any combination of such Boolean variables in exactly the case that none of the split linear programs
are feasible. In practice, CPLEX has built-in support for min, max, abs, and a handful of other
useful functions, though the above technique is still required to implement Gödel logic’s residuum,
negation, and equivalence operations as well as to select the specific intervals a sentence’s formula
truth values lie within.
Strict inequality. The described decision procedure also occasionally calls for continuous con-
straints with strict inequality, in particular when dealing with the complements of closed intervals,
but also when handling input open intervals or the Gödel residuum, (x ⇒ y) = y if x > y else
1. Linear programming, however, does not inherently support this. To implement strict inequality
constraints, we introduce a global gap variable δ ∈ [0, 1] to widen the distance between either side
of the inequality, e.g.
x ≥ y + δ, (15)
and then seek to maximize δ. If optimization yields an apparently feasible solution but with δ = 0,
we regard it as infeasible because at least one strict inequality constraint could not be honored strictly.
Again in practice, due to floating-point imprecision,MILP can sometimes return tiny though nonzero
values of δ even for x = y in (15); as a result, it is necessary to check if δ is greater than some
threshold rather than merely nonzero. We use δ > 10−8, which is much larger than the imprecision
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we have observed and yet much smaller than most truth values we consider. We observe that this
technique is roughly equivalent to replacing δ with 10−8 throughout, which has the added benefit of
freeing up the optimization objective for other uses in future extensions of the decision procedure,
such as determining the tightest bounds for which a theory can entail a query.
Simple sentences. We additionally observe that, for theories restricted to interval-based sentences,
it is sufficient to support only sentences containing a single formula and collection of truth value
intervals, i.e. SimpleSentences of the form (σ, S) for a single formula σ. This is because of the
following theorem:
Theorem E.1 Any interval-based sentence s = (σ1, . . . , σk, S1 × · · · × Sk) is equivalent to a
collection of simple sentences s1, . . . , sk, each given si = (σi, Si).
Proof Given interval-based sentence s and simple sentences s1, . . . , sk as described, one may apply
Rules (3) and (2) to obtain s′1, . . . , s
′
k given s
′
i = (σ1, . . . , σk, [0, 1]
i−1 × Si × [0, 1]k−i). One may
then repeatedly apply Rule (4) to compose these exactly into s. Likewise, one may apply Rules (2)
and (5) to obtain each si directly from s. Hence, the two forms are equivalent. 
Accordingly, socratic implements only SimpleSentence. In order to include an interval-based
sentence in a theory, one should instead include each of its component simple sentences as con-
structed above. In order to test the entailment of an interval-based sentence, one should separately
test the entailment of each of its component simple sentences.
Complementary intervals. As a last deviation from the described decision procedure, rather than
explicitly finding the complement of a collection of truth value intervals for a given query formula,
we simply adjust how constraints are expressed to force feasible solutions into the set of complemen-
tary intervals. Specifically, while the usual constraints require the formula’s truth value to lie within
some one of its intervals, the complementary constraints require the formula’s truth value to not lie
in any of its intervals, i.e. to lie to the left or the right of each of its intervals. We then reverse the
direction of each interval’s lower and upper bound constraints, adding or removing gap variable δ
as appropriate to switch between strict and nonstrict inequalities, and introduce Boolean parameters
to decide which of each pair of constraints should apply, i.e. to decide whether the formula’s truth
value should lie to the left or to the right. For example, if simple sentence has truth value intervals
[.2, .3], (.5, 1], the above would produce constraints
x ≤ .2− δ + (1− b1),
x ≥ .3 + δ − b1,
x ≤ .5 + (1− b2),
x ≥ 1 + δ − b2
Observe that the last of these cannot be satisfied for δ > 0 unless b2 = 1, which is consistent with
the compliment of (.5, 1] not having a right side in the interval [0, 1].
E.3 Experimental results
We tested socratic in three different experimental contexts:
• 3SAT and higher k-SAT problems which become satisfiable if any one of their input sen-
tences is removed
• 82 axioms and tautologies taken from Hájek in [7], some of which hold only for one of
Łukasiewicz or Gödel logic
• A formula that is classically valid but invalid in both Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic, unless
propositions are constrained to be Boolean
• A stress test running socratic on sentences with thousands of intervals
All experiments are conducted on a MacBook Pro with a 2.9 GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7, 16 GB
2133 MHz LPDDR3, and Intel HD Graphics 630 1536 MB running macOS Catalina 10.15.5.
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k-SAT. We construct classically unsatisfiable k-SAT problems of the form
(x1 ∧ ¬x1) ∨ · · · ∨ (xk ∧ ¬xk) (16)
which, after CNF conversion, yields for 3SAT
(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3), (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3), (x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3), (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3),
(x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬x3), (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3), (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3), (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬x3)
and similarly for larger k. The removal of any one clause in such a problem renders it satisfiable. We
observe that, when each clause is required to have truth value exactly 1 but propositions are allowed
to have any truth value, socratic correctly determines the problem to be
1) unsatisfiable in Gödel logic,
2) satisfiable in Gödel logic when dropping any one clause,
3) trivially satisfiable in Łukasiewicz logic with, e.g., xi = .5,
4) again unsatisfiable in Łukasiewicz logic when propositions are required to have truth values
in range either
[
0, 1
k
)
or
(
k−1
k
, 1
]
,
5) and yet again satisfiable in Łukasiewicz logic with constrained propositions when dropping
any one clause.
We observe that Gödel logic is much slower than Łukasiewicz logic as implemented in socratic,
likely because it performs mins and maxes between many arguments throughout while Łukasiewicz
logic instead performs sums with simpler mins and maxes serving as clamps to the [0, 1] range.
Interestingly, the difference between unsatisfiable and satisfiable in Gödel logic is significant; while
the satisfiable problems have one fewer clause, this is more likely explained by socratic finding
a feasible solution quickly. On the other hand, the unsatisfiable and satisfiable problems (with
constrained propositions) take roughly the same amount of time for Łukasiewicz, though the trivially
satisfiable problem is quicker. The apparent exponential increase in runtime is partially explained
by the fact that each larger problem has twice as many clauses, but runtime appears to be growing
by slightly more than a factor of 2 per each k.
Table 1: k-SAT runtimes in seconds for socratic with different experimental configurations. The
five columns pertain to items 1 through 5 above. The problem is unsatisfiable in classical and Gödel
logic, satisfiable in Gödel logic after removing a clause at random, trivially satisfiable in Łukasiewicz
logic with, e.g., xi = .5, unsatisfiable in Łukasiewicz logic if propositions are required to lie in
ranges sufficiently close to 0 and 1, and again satisfiable in Łukasiewicz logic with constrained
propositions when removing a clause at random.
Gödel Gödel Łukasiewicz Łukasiewicz Łukasiewicz
k unsatisfiable satisfiable trivial unsatisfiable satisfiable
3 .012 .011 .014 .019 .014
4 .022 .020 .022 .031 .033
5 .054 .043 .041 .047 .043
6 .121 .107 .064 .104 .098
7 .204 .255 .173 .167 .206
8 .404 .414 .273 .286 .308
9 .861 .881 .507 .539 .554
10 5.46 1.99 1.03 1.11 1.17
11 18.0 4.34 2.09 2.44 2.21
12 33.3 10.9 4.36 5.06 5.01
13 119 25.8 8.72 12.4 12.3
14 696 71.0 18.4 38.0 35.6
Hájek tautologies. Hájek lists many axioms and tautologies pertaining to a system of logic he
describes as basic logic (BL), consistent with any t-norm logic, as well as a number of tautologies
specific to Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic, all of which should have truth value exactly 1. We imple-
ment these tautologies in socratic and test whether the empty theory can entail them with truth
value 1 in their respective logics. The BL tautologies are divided into batches pertaining to specific
operations and properties:
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axioms 8 tests, e.g. (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ((ψ ⇒ χ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ χ))
implication 3 tests, e.g. ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ϕ)
conjunction 6 tests, e.g. (ϕ⊗ (ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ ψ
weak_conjunction 7 tests, e.g. (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ϕ
weak_disjunction 7 tests, e.g. ϕ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
negation 8 tests, e.g. ϕ⇒ (¬ϕ⇒ ψ)
associativity 6 tests, e.g. (ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ χ))⇒ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ χ)
equivalence 9 tests, e.g. ((ϕ ≡ ψ)⊗ (ψ ≡ χ))⇒ (ϕ ≡ χ)
distributivity 8 tests, e.g. (ϕ⊗ (ψ ∨ χ)) ≡ ((ϕ⊗ ψ) ∨ (ϕ⊗ χ))
delta_operator 3 tests, e.g.∆ϕ ≡ ∆(ϕ⊗ ϕ)
In addition, there are logic-specific batches of tautologies:
lukasiewicz 12 tests, e.g. ¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ
godel 5 tests, e.g. ϕ⇒ (ϕ⊗ ϕ)
Each of the above BL batches complete successfully for both logics and each of the logic-specific
batches complete for their respective logics and, as expected, fail for the other logic. The runtime of
individual tests are negligible; the entire test suite of 82 tautologies run on both logics complets in
just 2.911 seconds.
Boolean logic. We consider a formula σ defined
(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ((¬ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ψ) (17)
which is valid in classical logic but is not entailed with truth value 1 by the empty theory in either
Łukasiewicz or Gödel logic. Conversely, constraining propositions ϕ and ψ to have classical truth
values by introducing the sentences
(ϕ, [0, 0] ∪ [1, 1]),
(ψ, [0, 0] ∪ [1, 1])
into the theory succeeds in entailing σ in either logic. Indeed, if even one of these sentences is
added, σ is entailed, but no looser intervals around 0 and 1 can entail σ if both propositions are
non-Boolean. In the other direction, Łukasiewicz logic with unconstrained propositions entails the
sentence (σ, [.5, 1]), i.e. σ with truth value bounded above .5, while Gödel logic with unconstrained
propositions cannot entail σ with any interval tighter than [0, 1]. As a final example of the interaction
between truth value intervals, Gödel logic entails (σ, [t, 1]) for a lower bound truth value t if either
of ϕ or ψ is constrained in the theory to have set of candidate truth values {0} ∪ [t, 1].
Stress test. We consider the experimental configuration for Boolean logic above now with query
(σ, S) for S consisting of 10000 open intervals ( 1
k+1 ,
1
k
) for k from 2 to 10000 plus the closed
interval [.5, 1] and (ϕ, S′) and (ψ, S′) for S′ consisting of 10000 open intervals (1 − 1
k
, 1 − 1
k+1 )
plus the closed interval [0, 0]. We observe the runtime of socratic to be just 11.8 seconds for
Gödel logic and 9.38 seconds for Łukasiewicz logic. If we instead use closed intervals throughout,
measured runtimes are 17.4 seconds for Gödel and 9.29 seconds for Łukasiewicz.
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